Abstract-The share of electric vehicles (EVs) is expected to increase significantly in the vehicle market sales in the forthcoming years. Uncontrolled charging of EVs can affect adversely the normal operation of the power system, especially at the distribution level. This paper proposes a distributed, multi-agent EV charging control method based on the Nash Certainty Equivalence Principle that considers network impacts. Convergence of the method when the EVs control agents are uncoupled and weakly-coupled is discussed. The efficiency of the proposed management system is evaluated through simulation of a realistic, urban distribution network.
Several management concepts for efficient EV charging have been presented in the literature, most adopting a centralized control concept [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . These concepts are shown to work efficiently for a limited number of EVs, for a large EV fleet however, centralized management requires the acquisition and processing of a very large amount of local information from a central point requesting significant computational resources and communication overheads. Local information comprises the initial and the desired battery's state of charge (SOC), the maximum charging rate of each EV and the desired charging period.
Distributed control algorithms [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , can overcome these drawbacks. In this paper, an intelligent, decentralized approach is proposed, so that computation at local level is enabled without sacrificing the effectiveness of the centralized EV charging control. In this approach, EVs are characterized as agents with a certain level of autonomy taking decisions based on their local and global environment. Local environment denotes EV owner's preferences and charging infrastructure parameters, while the global environment means the network state (e.g., normal operation, grid imbalances etc.) and energy market conditions (e.g., day-ahead energy prices). Charging decisions aim to minimize the total battery charging costs. Such a distributed EV charging model under a ToU pricing policy has been presented in [16] . That model explores successfully the local optimal EV charging strategy, but fails to consider the network impacts. As proven in this paper however, this strategy under a simple ToU scheme, as the dual tariff, can result in high line and transformer loading and increased network losses.
In order to achieve an optimal EV charging strategy without disturbing network performance, the optimization of each EV's objective function needs to be constrained not only by local information about its own state, but also by the average state of all other agents. This is the concept of weakly-coupled EVs and has been introduced in [20] and [21] . In these papers the authors explore the charging strategy ("valley filling") of a large EV fleet by defining a series of charging prices in order to minimize generation cost. In the proposed approach the charging management model defines charging prices in order to minimize the load variation of each distribution feeder. According to [23] , under certain conditions, there is a triangle equivalence of losses, load factor and load variance in a distribution feeder. Minimizing load variance can equivalently maximize load factor and considering the Buller and Woodrow formula [24] , [25] , the maximization of load factor results in minimization of the energy losses [23] .
The operational framework for the implementation of the proposed charging management model is based on multi-agent system (MAS) technology [26] . The development of MAS 0885-8950/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE Fig. 1 . Hierarchical EV management structure in a distribution network [30] .
comprises three phases, namely analysis, design and implementation [27] . In the analysis phase, the developer establishes the environmental model, the preliminary roles of each agent in the organization, the interactions among them and the rules that the organization should respect. Once the requirements for the system have been modeled, the developer defines in detail the model (classes) of each agent in the design phase. In the implementation phase, the models from the analysis and design phases are utilized to code the system.
In Section II the analysis of the proposed MAS is outlined. Section III presents the design phase with an analytical description of the decentralized control concept, the uncoupled and weakly-coupled EV agents and the computational intelligence involved in each model. In Section IV, the developed MAS charging management system is implemented in a realistic model of an actual MV urban network and the results are comparatively assessed with the uncoupled case. In Section V the efficiency of the MAS distributed concept is compared with the respective centralized control concept. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. EV MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The adopted EV management architecture is a hierarchical aggregation model based on the Microgrid concept [28] , [29] as presented in Fig. 1 [30] . The basic agents are:
The Electric Vehicle Supplier Aggregator (EVS/A) agent is responsible for managing the energy charging requirements of a large, geographically dispersed EV fleet. The characteristics of the EVS/A depend on the way the market and regulatory framework will be implemented in each country. In the adopted framework, the EVS/A agent is an entity seeking for profit. It represents an energy service company, e.g., a retailer, who is responsible for purchasing the required charging electricity from the wholesale energy market. "Load management" services, i.e., allocation of EV demand during the load curve valley period reduce EV demand peaks and consequently energy market prices for charging the EVs. It is also possible that EVS/A participates in ancillary services markets being rewarded for providing load flexibility.
The Regional Aggregation Unit (RAU) is a virtual agent located at the primary substation (HV/MV) that manages a number of Microgrid Aggregation Unit (MGAU) agents and Cluster of Vehicles Controller (CVC) agents. It represents the EVS/A's policy. Several RAU agents can be generated by an EVS/A depending on the number of the primary substations existing in the controlled network The RAU agent is responsible for setting the pricing strategy that will satisfy the EV charging objectives contributing to optimal network operation. The prices set by the RAU agent are not actual market prices, but pricing signals reflecting the fact that higher demand results in higher market prices. In this paper, it is assumed that the pricing signals are proportional to transformer loading, considering both the inelastic non-EV and EV demand. More details are given in Section III.
The Microgrid Aggregation Unit (MGAU) and the Cluster of Vehicles Controller (CVC) are virtual agents located at secondary substations (MV/LV) providing mainly ancillary communication services. The MGAU agent manages EVs dispersed in an LV area and the CVC agent manages EVs clustered in large public or private access parking areas. MGAU and CVC agents aggregate the responses of the controlled EVs to the RAU pricing strategy and provide a single EV load profile to the RAU agent.
The Vehicle Controller (VC) agent represents the EV to the upstream network and expresses the EV owner's preferences to the MGAU or CVC. The VC agent has the ability to act autonomously and take decisions that fulfill individual goals, i.e., minimize the virtual charging cost, considering the RAU pricing strategy and the average state of other VC agents.
EVS/A aims at maximizing its total profit by allocating EV demand to achieve "valley-filling" during the low energy pricing period. It is clear that optimal market participation requires that EVS/A places appropriate bids in the energy and ancillary services markets, however the adopted "valley filling" concept, although sub-optimal, can provide economic benefits to the EVS/A, as discussed before. It should be noted, that in some practical energy systems, "valley filling" concept is shown to provide a near optimal system cost solution [31] . EVS/A sells the purchased energy from the wholesale market directly to EV owners. Further information concerning proper market mechanisms that quantify and reward the economic benefits from EV demand allocation can be found in [32] . EV owners are charged for their supplied energy assuming a dual-tariff scheme. Consequently, EV owners have no direct economic benefit from the allocation of their demand along the low energy pricing hours. Charging cost is assumed fixed and this is the reason for implementing virtual prices. However, EV owners can benefit from their participation in their demand management by sharing part of the EVS/A profits. The development of this business case is not in the scope of this paper.
The RAU pricing strategy is a multi-person decision making problem which can be solved by game-theoretic methods [33] . More specifically, the RAU pricing belongs to the category of single-objective, non-cooperative, dynamic games. It is a single objective problem because each player has only one goal to serve. The VC agent aims to fulfill the charging needs at the lowest cost, while the RAU agent tries to optimize the network operation. It is a non-cooperative game, because each player decides the strategy that minimizes his own charging objective function. Finally, it is a dynamic game because some players (VC agents) respond to the strategies that other players (RAU agents) have already announced. Such a game is played in rounds.
The market integration of EVs should not violate the technical security restrictions of the grid. One way to satisfy grid restrictions is to have the EV bids validated by the distribution system operator before they are sent to the market. In the proposed management concept, any grid violation, such as MV/LV transformer overloading, is treated locally by the MGAU agents following a similar pricing policy as RAU pricing policy. The EV demand of the problematic part of the network is treated as non manageable load by the RAU agent.
The communication infrastructure between the different agents in the proposed control concept requires two-way communication as well as reliable and secure communication with low latencies. In case of significant communication latencies, the proposed control may fail to converge at a near optimal solution.
There is a variety of communication technologies involved in the charging control concept, i.e., Power Line Communication (PLC), Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Wi-Fi, etc. The technology that fits well for one environment may not be suitable for the other. This is analyzed in [34] and [35] where the main advantages and disadvantages of implementing the various communication methods are presented.
The main consideration when deciding about a communication technology is the ease of implementation, the installation cost and the suitability, in terms of communication range, security, availability and scalability. For instance, the use of DSL connection could be a possible solution due to its widespread availability as well as low cost and high bandwidth data transmission, however, potential reliability and security issues might be raised. The utilization of existing infrastructure such as the mobile phone GSM network would be the most practical and cost effective solution. However, the cost of using GPRS technology is high since sending 1 Mb of data via GPRS is comparable to the cost of charging an EV [34] .
The operational cost of GPRS system can be limited when applied in combination with other communication technologies, such as PLC which is widely used in smart metering applications. Powerline networks are mainly characterized by two drawbacks namely low-bandwidth communication channels (20 kb/s for neighborhood area network [35] ) and short data transmission range. The proposed management concept enables the adaptation of PLC at the lowest layers of the control framework. The distributed computation of the EV charging schedule reduces the amount of data exchanged by processing it locally. Moreover, the implementation of intermediate aggregation layers contributes to the reduction of the requested communication range within acceptable bounds. Thus, the proposed approach does not pose any limitation in selecting the most appropriate communication technology.
III. FORMULATION OF DECENTRALIZED CHARGING CONTROL
The charging management of uncoupled, non-cooperative VC agents is examined first, in order to investigate the difficulties of implementing a distributed, price-based control concept. Next, the case of weakly-coupled, non-cooperative VC agents is analyzed.
A. Uncoupled VC Agents
The virtual charging cost of uncoupled VC agents depends on the EV owner's preferences (i.e., charging demand, plug-in period), the charging infrastructure (i.e., maximum charging rate) and the pricing strategy adopted by the RAU agent. The objective function which should be minimized by the VC agent has the following form:
(1) (2) (3) where is the starting time of charging, is the charging period, is the RAU pricing policy at time , is the charging power at time , is the initial battery SOC when the EV plugs in, is the energy capacity of the EV battery, is the charging efficiency and is the maximum charging power.
The continuous linear optimization problem (1)- (3) can be solved in discrete time by dividing the charging period in equal time steps of . The discrete charging optimization problem can be solved by implementing the heuristic algorithm developed in [16] . According to this algorithm, the VC agent obtains, randomly, an initial feasible solution and tries iteratively to allocate the charging power from the higher cost periods to the lower ones. Any power allocation should respect (3).
The outcome of this heuristic algorithm is the best EV response according to the RAU pricing strategy. Based on these responses, the RAU agent updates his pricing policy, so that higher prices reflect higher HV/MV transformer loading. Each VC agent responds to the new pricing policy with his new best response. This procedure is executed in every round of the game until no better equilibrium can be found. The pricing formula adopted by the RAU agent is (4) is the forecasted non-EV demand of the HV/MV transformer at time , is the best response of the th VC agent at time and is the nominal power of the transformer. At each time-step, the RAU pricing policy is specified by a function which is assumed to be a linear function of variable , where is the ratio of total demand divided by the nominal power of the HV/MV transformer.
The following example illustrates the uncoupled VC agents' response. It is assumed that , the average , KWh, , KWh. Fig. 2 presents the RAU agent's pricing policy derived by the best VC agent's response shown in Fig. 3 . In the first round, the RAU agent announces an initial set of charging prices. The VC agents' best response is to concentrate their charging demand during the central hours of the initial valley period. As a result, in the second round the RAU's prices increase during these hours. The VC agents respond by allocating their charging demand at the edges of the valley period creating double peaks. In the third round, the RAU agent increases the prices during the edge hours of the initial valley period and decreases them during the central valley hours. The VC agent's best response in the third round coincides with the response of the first round. In the following rounds, the RAU pricing strategy and the VC agent's best response oscillate between the single and doublepeak curves presented in Figs. 2 and 3 without reaching a better solution. Clearly, both single and double peak EV responses are not optimal for network operation.
B. Weakly-Coupled VC Agents
In the proposed game-theoretical charging strategy each individual is characterized by his state transitions and his payoff function. There are game models where individuals are coupled via their payoff function and their state transition, while in other models individuals are coupled only via their payoff function (weakly-coupled players).
In the weakly-coupled game approach, each VC agent knows his own dynamics (i.e., battery stage of charge and maximum charging rate), the RAU charging prices and the average state of all other agents together, referred as "mass" behavior. Therefore, a VC agent optimizes his objective function using local information for his own state and global information, i.e., the RAU's pricing strategy and the "mass" behavior of the other VC, in a statistical sense.
The dynamics of each VC agent can be written as
where is the charging interval of the charging period , and are the th VC agent's charging power and battery state of charge at time [ is the initial battery SOC when EV plugs in], is the capacity of the EV battery, is the charging efficiency and is the maximum charging power of the charging infrastructure. Assuming that all EVs should be fully charged at the end of the charging period, the following equalities hold:
Any that fully charges the EV battery within the charging period and simultaneously satisfies inequalities (6) , is a feasible strategy.
The objective function of a VC agent [21] is denoted by
where is a tracking parameter with non-negative constant value. Equation(9) consists of two factors, namely the virtual cost of charging according to the RAU's policy and the cost of deviating from the average behavior of the EV fleet [36] . The feasible set that minimizes the VC agent's objective function is the optimal one and the best VC agent's response to RAU strategy, . The set , which denotes the collection of the VC agent's best responses to the RAU strategy, is an -Nash Equilibrium. The existence and the convergence of the Nash Equilibrium have been analyzed in [20] and [21] . Accordingly, assuming that the RAU's pricing function is continuously differentiable and increasing proportionally to , the system converges at a unique Nash Equilibrium when the following inequalities hold for the tracking parameter:
The VC agent possesses certain level of intelligence, autonomy and adequate computational resources to optimize his response to the RAU strategy. Based on the previous analysis, (16) where EVs and time-steps Such a quadratic problem with linear constraints and bounds can be efficiently handled by various optimization methods including formal and heuristic methods. The adopted Hybrid-PSO method [37] can enhance the adaptability of the multi-agent control concept to future modifications, as it is a derivative-free technique and less sensitive to parameters and nature of the objective function. In case of alternative optimization options, the operation of the proposed control concept will not be significantly affected. Fig. 4 presents the RAU pricing strategy for the example of Fig. 3 , in the case of weakly-coupled VC agents. Fig. 5 shows the total non-EV and EV demand after each round. It can be seen that at each round, the charging instants with smaller non-EV demand are assigned to a larger individual EV charging and average charging rate. Iteratively, this provides a "valley filling" effect. The conditions of (11) are sufficient to ensure convergence at the Nash equilibrium. A very small tracking parameter results in non-convergence similar to the non-coupled VC agents. Appropriate choice of enables the system convergence within a few rounds, Fig. 5 .
IV. STUDY CASE
The proposed EV management system has been applied on a realistic model of an urban MV (20 kV) distribution feeder in the area of Katerini, Northern Greece, shown by the bold line in Fig. 6 .
In Fig. 7 the total active power demand curve during a typical winter and summer day is presented. The peak is approximately 11 MW during summer and the minimum 4.5 MW Data for the EV penetration level are obtained from [38] . In this report three different scenarios have been considered for Greece, called the sensible, the aggressive and the very aggressive one. Based on the aggressive scenario, 1200 EVs have been considered in this paper. Their allocation among the MV/LV substations is assumed proportional to the nominal capacity of each substation. According to [39] , the daily cumulative density function of travelled distances (km) in Greece is an exponential probabilistic density function presenting a mean value of 40 km for 95% of the EV fleet. Since an urban network is studied, vehicle class M1 has been considered with an average consumption of 0.15 kWh/km with a battery energy capacity of 24 kWh.
The plug-in and departure times of each individual EV are the two parameters defining the EV availability for home charging. Due to the stochastic nature of these parameters, a normal distribution function is considered for each one in the simulations. For the arrival time, the mean value is defined at 8:00 pm and a two hours deviation has been assumed. The respective values for the departure time are 6:00 am and one hour deviation. EV owners should completely benefit from the dual tariff charging scheme, thus, even in case an EV departures after 7:00 am, it will be fully charged within the low pricing period.
The impact of EV charging in the daily demand of the feeder is examined for different EV charging scenarios namely dumb, dual-tariff, uncoupled and weakly-coupled VC agents. The results for a typical winter and summer day are presented in Figs. 8 and 9.
It is shown that dumb charging results in an increased peak load during afternoon hours, when EV owners return home from their last daily trip and plug in their EVs. Compared with the non-EV case, the peak load increases by 19.74% in winter and 3.94% in summer. The simple application of dual-tariffs proves inadequate, because it simply shifts the EV demand at the beginning of the low price periods. In fact, for this particular application, the peak increase due to the EV load is higher (7.2%) compared to dumb charging scenario in a typical summer day. The allocation of the EV load by uncoupled and weakly-coupled VC agents satisfies the EV charging needs within the low energy pricing period supporting simultaneously an efficient network operation. This is confirmed by the indices presented in Tables I  and II for each charging scenario. In particular, the weakly-coupled case allocates the EV demand efficiently during the night low energy price hours, following a "valley filling" pattern, and results in minimization of losses. Figs. 10 and 11 show the maximum load due to EV charging demand in all parts of the feeder during the low-pricing period. The maximum line load in case of weakly-coupled agents is reduced by 7.56% in a typical summer day and 13.2% in a typical winter day, compared to the case of uncoupled agents. It can be concluded that, the management of weakly-coupled EV agents is more efficient for the network operation and enables higher EV deployment without resorting to additional network investments. Furthermore, in the case of weakly-coupled agents the total losses of the distribution line are reduced 2.3% in the winter day and 0.013% in the summer day compared to the case of uncoupled agents.
V. DECENTRALIZED VERSUS CENTRALIZED EV MANAGEMENT
It is interesting to compare the performance of the presented distributed EV management approach to a respective central- (21) where EVs, time-steps, is the non-EV demand of the distribution line at time-step and is the average distribution line load during the charging period . The load variance minimization problem (17)- (21) is a quadratic optimization problem with linear constraints. Fig. 12 illustrates the results of the centralized control approach applied on the example of Section III compared to the weakly-coupled approach (Fig. 5) . Similar results are obtained.
In the following, the amount of information processed and the computation time required for each approach are examined.
The required charging data for the control of EV charging is authorization data, time of EV plug-in, departure time, charging When centralized control is adopted, all charging data including all the "parasitic" information is communicated to a single central point, resulting in communication protocol overheads. In distributed control the transmitted information is minimized, since only the "best" EV responses are communicated. The introduction of intermediate layers and the aggregation of the EV best response profiles at local level, minimize the packets transmitted to the central point and thus the overheads of the central communication channel. Processing data locally reduces transfer latencies and increases the reliability of the communication network as analyzed in [41] .
A centralized approach requires processing the local information of each EV at a central point. As the number of EVs increases, the minimization of the load variance problem treated centralized becomes more complex due to the additional variables and constraints introduced by each EV. Computation time is highly dependent on the population of the EV fleet, while processing the local information at lower grid levels by distributed computational intelligence overcomes this drawback without affecting the quality of the results, as shown in Fig. 12 .
An approximate quantification of the computing requirements of the two approaches has been attempted in a laboratory environment. In the centralized approach, a central computer with increased computational resources (Intel i5 2400 K, 3.1 GHz, 4 cores, 8 GB DDR3, PCE-10700 1333 MHz) has been used. The distributed approach (weakly-coupled EVs) has been implemented on an integrated computer module with modest computational resources (Intel XscaleTM PXA255 processor at 400 MHz with 64 MB of RAM and 32 MB of flash memory). The MAS system has been developed in the Java Agent Development Framework (JADE) platform [40] , which provides facilities to develop an agent-based application on personal computers (PCs) and Java-enabled mobile devices overcoming the difficulties raised by EV mobility. The results of these experiments are illustrated in Fig. 13 . In the centralized approach, the increase in the computation time as a function of the number of EVs is polynomial, while it remains almost constant in the distributed approach. The adoption of a hierarchical management structure (Fig. 1) improves significantly the performance of the proposed distributed EV control. The implementation of distributed charging control without intermediate aggregation layers transforms the polynomial convergence of centralized control to linear one, as proven in [17] . This is justified by the fact that the agent at the highest level still needs to process messages from all EVs. The implementation of a hierarchical architecture, as proposed in this paper, enables the RAU agent to process only a few aggregated charging profiles provided by the MGAU agents. Fig. 13 indicates that the overall time performance of the proposed distributed algorithm is almost independent of the number of controlled EV. Therefore, the adoption of intermediate aggregation layers enhances the scalability of the distributed control.
The time of computing the EV best response is less than 13 s per round, while the total computation time of the equilibrium in the distributed approach is only slightly increased with the number of EVs due to the communication delays at each round of this game-theoretical model. The average round-trip time (send message and receive reply) between MGAU and VC was calculated less than 60 ms. The communication between the MGAU agents and the RAU agent increases up to 500 ms due to the fact that they belong to different JADE platforms. Detailed studies about the messaging performance of FIPA interaction protocols are provided in [42] and [43] . In conclusion, the round-trip time of communication between the upper and the lowest layer of the distributed approach of Fig. 1 , in this specific implementation does not exceed 600 ms. Since the distributed control algorithm converges to equilibrium after a few rounds, the communication delays between the aggregation layers should also be considered in the computation time Overall, the distributed control approach proposed requires less than 55 s to converge to equilibrium independently of the size of the EV fleet.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a distributed, multi-agent EV management system is presented which satisfies the energy requirements of a large number of EVs considering their owner's preferences and ensuring the efficient operation of the network. The proposed distributed control concept is a single-objective, non-cooperative, dynamic game which converges to an å-Nash equilibrium under the condition of weakly coupled VC agents. Simulations on a realistic MV feeder confirm the inability of dumb charging and simple dual-tariff schemes to integrate a large number of EVs without affecting adversely the power networks performance. It is shown that the proposed approach allocates efficiently EV energy requirements during off-peak hours achieving effective "valley filling", leading to maximization of load factor and minimization of energy losses. The proposed decentralized approach provides results of similar quality compared to the centralized approach with limited computer resources and modest communication requirements. The computation time of the distributed EV management system presented is almost independent of the population of the controlled EV fleet compared to the polynomial function noted in the centralized concept. The adopted EV management hierarchy improves the scalability of the proposed approach.
